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The objective of this study is to identify experimental economic tools that can be employed 
to explain the role of economic behavior in overweight and obesity in the household. We 
identify three economic experiments that can be used to understand how parent-child 
economic relationships relate to obesity. Loss aversion experiments are discussed as a tool 
to understand challenges some individuals face in achieving a healthy diet. Finally, testbed 
experiments are introduced as a means to test and understand new policies and incentives 
for better health at the household level. 
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It is increasingly accepted that both the 
environment and behavior affect the propen­
sity of overweight and obesity in the household 
(French, Story, and Jeffery; Friedman 2003, 
2004; Hill 1998, 2003). It is less clear how such 
factors interact with the economic characteris­
tics of the household. Economists have con­
sidered the effects of prices and government 
policies on the propensity toward obesity for 
certain demographic groups. For example, 
overweight and obesity is more prevalent in 
low-income households, Hispanic and African 
American households, and households with 
working mothers (Anderson, Butcher, and 
Levine 2003; Sigman-Grant 2003). Although 
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general macroeconomic analyses of the prob­
lem can tell us who is obese, it does not tell us 
why they are obese or explain heterogeneity 
within the demographic groups. 
The need is clear and present to understand 
which decisions and behaviors, including 
economic behavior, lead to overweight and 
obesity in the household. Childhood over­
weight and obesity (COO) is of special concern 
because we have yet  to  realize the  full  
consequences of early overweight and obesity 
in life. Over the last 20 years, COO has 
increased from 4% to 17% among children 
and adolescents between 2 and 19 years of age 
in the United States1 (Centers for Disease 
1 Overweight and obesity is categorized by the 
Body Mass Index (BMI), which is determined by the 
formula: weight/height2 (kg/m2). Among adults, over­
weight is classified by a BMI between 25.0 and 29.9, 
whereas a BMI greater than or equal to 30.0 defines 
obesity (CDC 2004a). Overweight in children is 
typically not referred to as ‘‘obesity,’’ although these 
terms will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
Overweight in children is defined as a BMI that 
surpasses the 95th percentile of a fixed distribution for 
a child’s age and gender (CDC 2004a). 
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Control and Prevention/National Center for 
Health Statistics (CDC 2004a,b, 2006a,b; 
Institute of Medicine; Ogden et al.). Current­
ly, 61% of overweight children have at least 
one additional risk factor for heart disease 
and are at greater risk of Type II diabetes. 
They also have higher probability of sleep 
apnea and social and psychological problems 
(CDC 2006b; Mokdad et al.). In the future, 
we will see an increased occurrence of life-
threatening illnesses affecting children and 
adolescents, such as early kidney failure, 
coronary heart disease, and limb amputations 
(Ludwig). This is of import to policy devel­
opment because society (not just obese 
individuals) incurs the costs of obesity 
through third-party insurance and govern­
ment programs such as Medicare and Medic­
aid. As of 2003, obesity contributed to 
$75 billion in medical expenditures in the 
United States. The state-level annual Medic­
aid costs ranged from $23 million in Wyo­
ming to $3.5 billion in New York. Annual 
Medicare costs ranged from $15 million in 
Wyoming to $1.7 billion in California (CDC 
2004c). Experts predict the costs of obesity 
will jeopardize the solvency of Medicare in the 
future (Ludwig). 
The objective of this study is to outline 
experimental economic tools that could help 
explain the effect of economic behavior on 
overweight and obesity in the household. Over 
the last 25 years, economists have used 
experiments to develop policies relating to 
problems such as pollution and environmental 
regulation (e.g., Cason; Cason, Gangadharan, 
and Duke 2003; Cherry, Crocker, and Shog­
ren), airline deregulation (Smith), and ac­
counting issues (e.g., Kachelmeier and Sheha­
ta). These experiments shed light on important 
behavioral considerations beyond institutional 
constructs, which improve market allocation 
efficiencies and policy outcomes. In this spirit, 
we discuss the behavioral dimensions that 
other fields find relevant to the obesity 
epidemic. We then identify possible economic 
behaviors, their relevant experiments, and 
which tools can be used for understanding 
these behaviors. 
Background 
Although family genetics do influence an 
individual’s susceptibility toward overweight 
and obesity, the rapid change in its prevalence 
is evidence of changing behavioral and envi­
ronmental factors affecting individual weight 
outcomes (French, Story, and Jeffrey; Fried-
man 2003, 2004; Hill 1998, 2003). These 
behavioral and environmental factors are 
broad and far-reaching. Thus far, many 
researchers outside of economics have focused 
more on micro- rather than macro-level issues 
and variables. Specifically, different dimen­
sions of parent-child and family relationships 
are identified as key elements to understand­
ing child health outcomes (Agras and Masco­
la; Birch and Fisher; Fiore et al.; Gable and 
Lutz; Patrick and Nicklas; Stang, Rehorst, 
and Golicic; Strauss and Knight). 
Recent literature focuses on parent feeding 
styles with their child. Family attitudes and 
beliefs relating to food determine when, where, 
and how children eat, even beyond the 
preschool years (Birch and Fisher; Faith et 
al.; Stang). Whether or not families eat 
together influences the child’s food knowledge 
and habits, especially with regard to fruit and 
vegetable consumption (Cooke et al.; Davison, 
Francis, and Birch; Mamum et al.; Schroeter, 
House, and Lorence; Variyam, Shim, and 
Blaylock; Wardle, Carnell, and Cooke). When 
feeding children, it is important that parents 
are not excessive in restricting access to 
unhealthy foods, do not overly encourage the 
eating of certain foods, and limit the use of 
food as a reward (Ritchie et al.). This style of 
feeding has been defined as ‘‘authoritative’’— 
parents encourage healthy eating, but the 
children are given the ultimate choice in 
deciding what they eat (Davison, Francis, 
and Birch; Patrick et al.). Two other feeding 
styles are ‘‘authoritarian’’ and ‘‘permissive.’’ 
Authoritarian parents exercise extreme control 
over eating. This can be negative if parents 
limit children’s abilities to self-regulate their 
food intake (Ritchie et al.). On the other hand, 
permissive parents often allow the child too 
much freedom over food eating without 
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structured meal settings, which also leads to 
increased risk of overweight and obesity. 
In addition to parent feeding behavior, 
parent-child physical fitness relationships are 
also important. Children’s physical fitness is 
shaped by their parents’ physical fitness behav­
ior and attitudes (e.g., Epstein et al.; Lindsay 
et al.). Parents model active behavior when they 
engage in sports and actively play with their 
child. Other behaviors that contribute to seden­
tary behavior, such as television viewing, could 
be influenced by family, too (Lindsay et al.). 
So far, the role of economics becomes more 
obvious at the macro level when considering 
environmental variables influencing obesity 
and overweight. Economists find changing 
values of time, food costs, food technology, 
and physical activity all coincide with increas­
ing overweight and obesity in the household. 
Over the past two decades, higher wages in the 
workplace led to a decrease in the household 
time  devoted to family meal  preparation  
(Capps, Tedford, and Havlicek; Chou and 
Grossman). Convenience and fast food de­
mand has increased because of a higher 
number of women working. A factor contrib­
uting to the increased demand for food away 
from home is the doubling of the per capita 
number of fast food restaurants between 1972 
and 1997, reducing the search and travel time 
for food (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer). 
As time increased in value, food costs fell 
because of production technology improve­
ments and agricultural policy incentives. 
Agricultural policies and the switch from 
individual to mass food preparation have 
reduced the price of food energy consumed 
(Drenowski; Pollan). At the same time, 
technological change lowered real food prices 
while shifting the work environment from 
manual to sedentary labor (Lakdawalla and 
Philipson; Philipson and Posner). Of each 
consumer dollar spent, food accounted for 
13 cents in 2003, down from 32 cents in 
1950 and 43 cents in 1901 (Atkinson).2 
2 Recent estimates by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture/Economic Research Service (USDA/ERS) 
suggest that the share of disposable income spent on 
food is about 9.9% (2006). 
Unfortunately, these price reductions have 
nonmarket costs linked to them. The resulting 
lower cost energy sources have been noted for 
their high fat and sugar content (Drenowski). 
High-calorie foods have assumed a main role 
in the U.S. food supply because they are good-
tasting, cheap, and convenient to consume 
(Drenowski and Levine). Although the num­
ber of calories consumed has increased, 
calories expended have remained relatively 
constant since the 1980s (Cutler, Glaeser, and 
Shapiro). The resulting energy imbalance 
manifested itself in higher weight. 
Other, noneconomic environmental vari­
ables affecting overweight and obesity include 
changes at home and in schools. These 
variables include the physical structure of the 
neighborhood and school food policies, in 
particular the availability of soda and vending 
machine snacks (Anderson and Butcher; 
Economist). 
Economic Experiments and Obesity 
The existing economic literature does not 
determine who is most susceptible to changes 
(such as a ‘‘fat tax’’) in the economic 
environment or how they translate to specific 
household behavior.3 We believe a better 
understanding of the economic behaviors 
underlying the obesity epidemic is necessary 
to formulate effective policy interventions. We 
identify several economic behaviors related to 
obesity, and their relevant experiments are 
presented in Table 1. Four economic experi­
ments (dictator, ultimatum bargaining, trust, 
and ‘‘carrot stick’’ experiments) could be 
employed to understand how parent and child 
economic relationships relate to obesity. Food 
policy research suggests time preference is 
important in the timing and consistency of 
food purchases in the household (Shapiro; 
Sigman-Grant). A basic time preference ex­
periment is identified as a tool to measure 
individuals’ discount rates and how they relate 
to overweight and obesity in the household. 
3 Several states plan to impose or broaden sales 
taxes or ‘‘fat taxes’’ on soft drinks or syrups and to 
adjust taxes on other food items (Uhlman). 
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Table 1. Dimensions of Economic Behavior and Related Economic Experiments 
Economic Behavior of 
Obesity-Linked Issue Interest/Issue Economic Experiment 
Parent control relating to food 
Irregular food consumption 
over monthly period 
Unhealthy eating habits continue 
Poor incentives to be healthy 
Power and control in the 
household 
Hyperbolic discounting 
Loss aversion 
Incentive design 
Bargaining and negotiation 
experiments 
Time preference/hyperbolic 
discounting 
Loss aversion 
Testbed experiments 
Loss aversion experiments are discussed as a 
tool to understand the challenges some 
individuals face in achieving a healthy diet. 
Finally, testbed experiments are introduced as 
a means to test and understand new policies 
and incentives for better health at the house­
hold level. 
Bargaining/Negotiation Experiments 
Children differ from adults in that they are not 
primarily price-takers in the market. Children 
typically receive the food they eat from their 
parents. As the literature suggests, the way in 
which this transfer occurs can vary dramati­
cally from family to family (Birch and Fisher; 
Fiore et al.; Gable and Lutz; Patrick and 
Nicklas; Stang, Rehorst, and Golicic; Strauss 
and Knight). Economists can use economic 
experiments to determine how differences in 
parenting styles might also be reflected in 
differences in economic behavior between the 
parent and child. The dictator game, ultima­
tum bargaining game, and carrot stick exper­
iments measure generosity, fairness, and pun­
ishment and reward expectations between 
individuals. In this two-player dictator game, 
a dictator is endowed with an allocation, x, 
and decides what portion of x to give the other 
player, the recipient. The Nash equilibrium 
prediction is that the dictator will give the 
recipient nothing through self-interest. Yet, 
the standard experimental result rejects the 
notion of complete self-interest. Instead, the 
dictator gives the recipient at least some small 
portion of the allocation (Davis and Holt). 
This indicates that there is some level of 
altruism compelling individuals to share their 
riches. 
The ultimatum bargaining game is like the 
dictator game, but the recipient has an 
opportunity to respond to the dictator’s offer. 
The dictator becomes a proposer, and the 
recipient can either accept or reject the offer 
made. The Nash equilibrium prediction is that 
the proposer will make a very small offer, e, 
and the respondent will accept this offer 
because it is better than nothing. Again, the 
Nash equilibrium is rejected in experiments. 
The proposer offers a substantial portion of 
the endowment, from 25% to 50%, and the 
respondent demands a similar amount. The 
amount offered and accepted depends on the 
proposer and respondent’s social and cultural 
fairness norms (Henrich et al.; Roth et al.). 
Although both of these experiments may 
be used to measure basic economic behavior in 
the household, they do not allow continuous 
interaction between household members. One 
experiment that does allow for continuous 
interaction is the carrot stick experiment 
developed by Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Ves­
terlund. Unlike the dictator game, the respon­
dent is given the opportunity to punish or 
reward the dictator after receiving an alloca­
tion from the endowment. The respondent can 
pay the experimenter a small fee (e.g., 1 dollar 
or token) to give (reward) or take (punish) a 
notable amount (e.g., 4 dollars or tokens) 
from the dictator. If the respondent takes 
earnings away from the dictator, the earnings 
go to the experiment bank, not directly to the 
respondent. Likewise, if the respondent gives 
earnings to the dictator, they are bought from 
the experiment bank and do not come directly 
from the respondent. This arrangement makes 
either giving or taking earnings from the 
dictator more direct reward or punishment. 
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The respondent also has the option not to 
change the dictator’s earnings in any way. 
Ehmke et al. adapted the carrot stick game 
to measure control dynamics in the parent-
child relationship that could affect COO. The 
parent is placed in the dictator role and the 
child is the respondent. The parent is endowed 
with $5.00 in $0.25 tokens. He or she decides 
how many tokens to send to the child. Once the 
child receives his or her tokens, the child then 
decides whether or not to reward or punish the 
parent. When the game is complete, the child 
has the option to spend his or her tokens in the 
experimental store. Following within subject 
design, the experimental store is stocked with 
toys and books in the first treatment and with 
junk food in the second treatment. The 
experiment is used to test several hypotheses, 
including whether parental giving is signifi­
cantly different across treatments on the basis 
of both child and parental weight status. 
The results from the experiment indicate 
that parental weight is the most important 
determinant of parental generosity and child 
control in the game. All parents give an 
average of 56% of the endowment to their 
children in the nonfood treatment. This drops 
to an average of 33% of the endowment given 
to children in the food treatment. However, 
giving between healthy (parent BMI # 25) and 
overweight and obese parents (parents BMI . 
25) is significantly different. Parents with 
higher BMIs give more to their children to 
spend on junk food. This indicates heavier 
parents might be less concerned with the 
consequences of giving their children money 
to spend on junk food. 
Such experiments provide an important 
link to understanding the connection between 
economic behavior and other general family 
health– and nutrition-related behavior. They 
also provide a potential tie between economics 
and research in other disciplines, including 
psychology, sociology, family studies, and 
health fields. 
Time Preference Experiments 
One of the challenges for many households is 
to maintain a healthy and steady nutritional 
intake over the course of the month. Young 
children are not able to make the metabolic 
adjustments to variations in calorie intake and 
are more at risk of overweight and obesity 
(Sigman-Grant). Thus, food insecurity could 
be a factor in obesity prevalence. Shapiro finds 
caloric intake among low-income food stamp 
recipients declines 10% to 15% over the course 
of a month. The relationship between food 
stamp use and overweight and obesity is 
positive for low-income women and young 
girls, but leads to underweight boys (Gibson). 
When food stamps are dispersed at the 
beginning of the month, approximately 90% 
are spent in the first 3 days of dispersion 
(Klinefelter). This evidence implies food stamp 
recipients display a high, if not hyperbolic 
time preference. 
Harrison, Lau, and Williams designed one 
of the most referenced experiments for mea­
suring time preference. They develop a basic 
methodology to measure subjects’ discount 
rates. In their study, Danish subjects were 
asked if they would prefer to have $100 in 1 
month or $100 + x in 7 months. Subjects 
answered 15 repeated versions of this ques­
tion, with x increasing in each question. The 
researchers aim was to determine the point at 
which a subject chooses to receive payment in 
7 months instead of in the next month. If a 
subject chooses to receive the money in 7 
months, it is implied that their discount rate is 
x% over the 6-month period. 
This experiment can be adjusted to account 
for hyperbolic discounting. Individuals exhibit 
hyperbolic discounting when their discount 
rate (i.e., internal interest rate) is not consis­
tent over time and actually declining over time 
(Frederick, Lowenstein, and O’Donoghue). 
More simply, individuals value short-term 
gains/losses more than long-term gains/losses. 
The Harrison, Lau, and Williams experiment 
can be adjusted to measure the degree of 
hyperbolic discounting a subject exhibits. 
Using the Harrison, Lau, and Williams 
experiment, the subject first decides whether 
she wants $100 in 1 week or $100 + x in 8 days. 
Then, she is asked whether she would like 
$100 in 7 months or $100 + x in 7 months and 
1 day. If she displays hyperbolic discounting, 
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she will be less willing to wait for x in 8 days, 
but more indifferent to waiting for it in 7 
months versus 7 months and 1 day. 
Experimental measures of individual dis­
count rates could help explain the challenges 
that low-income families face as they allocate 
food expenditures over a month. It could be 
that the hyperbolic discounting behavior 
observed by Shapiro might be measurable in 
an experimental setting. If there is a relation­
ship between high and/or hyperbolic time 
preference and an individual’s diet composi­
tion, economic experiments can explain these 
relationships. Policy mechanisms might then 
be better designed to help low-income house­
holds with high or irregular time preference to 
eat a more healthy diet throughout the month. 
Loss Aversion Experiments 
A healthy diet is one key to a healthy weight. 
For many, though, ‘‘dieting’’ is often viewed 
as sacrificing food consumption to gain health 
benefits, and despite prior plans to make this 
sacrifice, many fail to actually carry it out. 
One reason individuals struggle to maintain a 
healthy diet might be because of an economic 
phenomenon called loss aversion. Loss aver­
sion is the tendency for people to base 
decisions on movements away from a current 
state rather than on the final outcome and to 
regard losses from that state more than gains 
(see Kahneman and Tversky, and Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler for evidence and model 
specifications). 
If people are loss-averse, atmosphere be­
comes an important part of their diet struggle. 
Studies have shown that anticipation of food, 
whether physical (sight, smell) or psycholog­
ical (thought of food), can trigger biological 
responses that prepare the body to digest food 
(Johnson and Wildman; Mattes; Powley; 
Simon et al.). If passing fast food restaurants 
and vending machines can trigger a physio­
logical response, individuals must constantly 
choose not to consume these products, rather 
than decide whether and what to eat, as 
implied by traditional utility theory. Compar­
ison of food intake surveys by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) shows 
that caloric intake during meals has declined, 
whereas the number of calories during snacks 
has increased (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro).4 
Even if a person originally preferred a healthy 
lifestyle to an unhealthy lifestyle, loss aversion 
allows an immediate reversal of preferences 
once snacks or fast food meals become 
available. 
Experiments have been designed to mea­
sure loss aversion with riskless and risky 
choices. One common experiment to test for 
loss aversion in riskless choices begins by 
randomly selecting half the participants in an 
experiment to endow with an object of value. 
For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Tha­
ler endow half their subjects with coffee mugs 
and ballpoint pens. After allowing all partic­
ipants to thoroughly inspect the object, 
willingness to pay is calculated for the group 
without the object and willingness to accept is 
calculated for individuals endowed with the 
object. If the objects are assigned randomly, 
there is no reason one group would have 
stronger preferences than the other. However, 
experiments show that those endowed with the 
object value the object much more than those 
not endowed with the object. The ratio of 
willingness to accept to willingness to pay 
measures the degree of loss aversion. 
Another version of these experiments is to 
give half of the participants in an experiment 
one item and half of the participants another 
item of equal value. After inspection of the 
items, participants are given the opportunity 
to switch. If the allocation is random, one 
would expect either a strong preference for 
one of the goods (perhaps everyone likes the 
first good more) or about half the participants 
to switch. Instead, experiments find a strong 
bias against switching. Knetsch and Sinden 
carried out this experiment with a lottery 
ticket and $2. This experiment can test for the 
presence of loss aversion but it cannot 
measure it. 
Perhaps the simplest way to measure an 
individual’s loss aversion occurs under uncer­
4 There is a strong link between caloric intake and 
portion size (Rolls et al. 2002; Nielsen and Papkin 
2003; Diliberti et al. 2004) 
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tainty. Ga¨tcher and Johnson ask subjects 
whether they would be willing to accept a 
gamble of winning $X or losing $Y based on a 
coin toss. Keeping X constant, they increase Y 
incrementally until the participant no longer 
accepts the gamble. For small monetary 
amounts, they argue that the ratio X/Y 
measures the degree of loss aversion. 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser found evidence 
of loss aversion in both survey and field data.5 
In their lab experiments, they provided several 
scenarios about investment portfolios. In one 
treatment, they asked subjects in which of four 
portfolios they would invest a large inherited 
sum of money. In another treatment, they ask 
subjects which of the same four investments 
they would choose, but instead of inheriting 
money, they inherit one of the portfolios. 
There is a strong tendency for people not to 
switch regardless of the portfolio inherited. 
They find similar evidence in actual decisions 
between health care and retirement plans. 
The presence of loss aversion has direct 
implications for dietary policy and goals. 
When framing the dietary discussion, loss 
averse individuals will be more swayed by 
what they will have to give up rather than by 
what they gain. Levin et al. showed this to be 
true with regard to controlling cholesterol. 
Participants told the positive benefits of 
reducing red meat consumption were less 
likely to reduce their consumption than those 
given the same information focusing on the 
negative effects of continuing to eat red meat. 
In light of these findings, two things 
become evident. First, if the goal is to move 
an individual away from an unhealthy life­
style, the most effective way might be to focus 
on the negative effects of the current lifestyle 
rather than the positive effects of a new 
lifestyle. Second, in the long run, the best 
policy might be to develop a ‘‘culture of 
health,’’ wherein choosing the unhealthy 
lifestyle means giving something up, rather 
than the other way around, as most people 
may currently view it. 
5 Samuelson and Zeckhauser call the effect ‘‘status 
quo bias.’’ 
Testbed Experiments 
A type of economic experiment named 
‘‘testbed’’ experiments might be helpful when 
considering new approaches to align the costs 
of obesity with the decisions that result in 
obesity. Testbed experiments are used to 
implement new processes and ensure that 
these processes work once they are imple­
mented. Plott (1994) discusses the use of 
testbedding as it applies to market experi­
ments. Through testbed experiments, market 
policies are testbedded either to ensure design 
consistency or to see whether the theory 
underlying a mechanism correctly explains 
what the mechanism accomplishes. With 
market inefficiencies, the experiments can be 
used to test theoretical explanations of the 
efficiencies and how the markets could be 
improved. 
Testbed experiments could be useful tools 
as policy makers and business managers 
consider new ways to deal with the surmount­
ing but disproportionally dispersed health care 
costs. If government or private industry want 
to consider schemes to more closely align costs 
with the individual (e.g., Medical Savings 
Accounts are currently being implemented to 
do this), they can test new approaches with the 
use of testbed experiments. This can be done 
as overall policies are developed or as 
incremental processes needed to achieve these 
policy are developed (e.g., Plott [1997] uses 
testbed experiments to understand different 
steps in the Federal Communications Com­
mission’s auction of licenses for personal 
communication systems). Furthermore, they 
could be used to explore what other social 
factors influence individuals’ support of new 
insurance and policy schemes (Durant and 
Putterman). For example, one question to 
explore might be whether individuals’ prefer­
ences for progressive taxation override the 
acceptability of a flat tax in the form of a fat 
tax in order to reduce unhealthy food 
consumption. 
In the case of health insurance and public 
health programs, testbed experiments could be 
used to test mechanism design alternatives to 
increase individual incentives for individual 
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health and weight reduction. Some programs 
that have been considered include reducing 
health care premiums for those who maintain 
a healthy lifestyle. A testbed experiment could 
be used to determine what premium reduction 
would increase participation in such programs 
and how long a participant would need to 
participate for insurance companies to benefit. 
A laboratory experiment could be designed 
across multiple rounds, with individuals play­
ing the roles of the insured and insurer. 
Testbed experiments offer cost advantages 
to companies and government officials as they 
develop new experiments. In the case of health 
care, the costs of implementing new policies 
are high and the possible costs associated with 
poor outcomes could be even higher. By 
testing new policies and incentives in the lab, 
practitioners could save society substantial 
loss associated with the costs of implementa­
tion. 
Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Future Research 
The obesity epidemic has been compared with 
global warming. Although not all of the 
scientific evidence is at its full potential, 
especially with regard to childhood obesity, 
enough is present to encourage action before 
the full evidence of potential disaster sets in 
(Ludwig). As we consider the possible actions 
to prevent and deal with this looming health 
threat, economic experiments are a convenient 
way to test underlying causes of and possible 
policy solutions for the problem. They could 
be specifically helpful at the household level to 
understand underlying economic behavior 
issues, as well as how households interact with 
the market for policy design. 
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